Psychological theories disagree on how we attribute emotions to people. A new neuroimaging study shows that such attributions involve a large number of abstract features, rather than a small set of emotion categories.
The most popular emotion theories propose either two broad dimensions -arousal and valence (pleasantness) [1] -or a small number (around six) of discrete 'basic' emotions [2] . The first, dimensional, view has the virtue of economy and is supported by finding that many kinds of emotion data can be mapped well into a two-dimensional space [3, 4] . The second view derives much of its support from the study of human facial expressions, and also corresponds well to emotions we would typically attribute to people and animals (the list includes anger, fear, and disgust). Yet a third theoretical proposal argues that the rich emotions that people experience unfold through a complex set of evaluations and coping mechanisms. Such 'appraisal' theories invoke a larger vocabulary of features from which a correspondingly larger set of emotions can be constructed [5, 6] . All three theories have some appeal, and all three probably reflect aspects of what people actually do when they attribute emotions to others as well as to themselves. Is there any way to adjudicate further between the theories?
A new study by Skerry and Saxe [7] , reported in this issue of Current Biology, now provides such adjudication, based on an important and relatively new source of data: neuroimaging. The study had participants attribute emotions by reading short stories while lying in a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scanner, and quantified which of the three emotion theories best corresponded with the patterns of evoked brain activations.
Measuring Emotion Attribution
One reason there are competing theories of emotion is that we attribute emotions to people and animals on the basis of a wide range of evidence. Some data come from people describing how they feel; additional clues arise from interpreting particular kinds of behaviors (facial expressions, body posture); and yet more information can be derived from the circumstances in which people find themselves. Skerry and Saxe [7] focused on the latter type of evidence. As their stimuli, the authors chose short, written vignettes that explicitly described situational causes of emotions; for example, how do you think Dana feels from the following actual sample stimulus:
''Dana always wanted a puppy, but her parents said it was too much of a hassle. One summer afternoon, Dana's parents returned from a supposed trip to the grocery store, and Dana heard barking from inside her garage. She opened the door to see her parents holding a golden retriever puppy.'' While these stimuli necessarily lack the full complexity of real-life emotion attribution, they have the benefit of allowing experimental control over the explicit information on the basis of which subjects make the attributions. The study used 10 different stories for each of 20 emotions (200 stimuli in total; the 20 emotions were arbitrarily chosen, with half of them positive and half negative in valence), and controlled for other possible confounds, such as the complexity of the sentences used, or the ease with which they could be read.
Skerry and Saxe [7] first collected behavioral ratings for their stimuli from an independent set of people queried over the internet, and then compared these to the brain activations evoked in the subjects of the neuroimaging study. Three different feature spaces were constructed based on the internet ratings, corresponding to the three different emotion theories investigated. Which of these three spaces best matched the neural data?
Methodological Challenges
This question was addressed using a technique called Representational Similarity Analysis (RSA) [8, 9] , the flow of which we summarize in Figure 1 . Take a given stimulus, say a vignette evoking an attribution of apprehensiveness (blue stimuli in Figure 1 , first column). Each of the three theories (second column) posits a representation of this emotion in a specific space (38 dimensions for the appraisal model, six for the basic emotions model, and two for the valence/arousal model). The 20 emotions can be represented in each feature space using average behavioral ratings (the third column shows the representations of apprehensive, furious, and joyful; see also Figure 2A -C in the paper [7] , which shows the data for all the emotions used). Next one compares the similarity between all possible pairs of emotions -how far apart the 20 emotions lie in each of the three different representational spaces. For example, in the valence/arousal space, apprehensive and furious appear more similar to one another than to joyful ( Figure 1 , third column). This intuition can be formalized into a Representational Dissimilarity Matrix (RDM), computed using a Euclidean distance measure for each of the competing theories ( Figure 1 , fourth column; see also Figure 3 , top, in the paper [7] ). This analysis essentially maps the similarity structure of different stimuli, when rated according to the three different emotion theories: which emotions cluster together as similar, and which seem very different from one another?
An analogous approach can be taken for the neuroimaging data, generating a neural RDM (for dorsomedial prefrontal cortex as one example: Figure 1 , bottom row; see also Figure 3 , center, in the original paper [7] ). In this case, it is not the profiles of how people rate the stimuli on various features that determine the similarity between the stimuli, but rather the different patterns of activation evoked across voxels in a given brain region when participants read the stimuli in the scanner.
The question now is: which feature space (from the behavioral ratings) looks most like the neural RDM (from the neuroimaging) -the one for valence/ arousal, the one for the six basic emotions, or the one built on appraisal theory? This comparison can be done with a rank correlation measure ( Figure 1 , rightmost column). The study [7] found compelling evidence that the neural RDMs in all brain regions correlate best with the model feature space of appraisal theory. With the particular stimuli used in the study, the six-emotion and valence/arousal models failed to capture the representational geometry measured in any of the investigated brain regions.
Yet appraisal advocates should not rejoice too hastily. The methods used here lack the sensitivity to conclude that a 38-dimensional appraisal theory is the ''right'' model: the noise ceiling (the expected RDM correlation achieved by the unknown true model) has a lower bound less than 0.1 for all brain regions (see dotted lines in Figure 4 and Figure S3 in the paper [7] ). As a correlation-based measure, the theoretically best value in the absence of noise is 1.0; Nili et al. [8] report a value of about 0.25 for a study of human IT fMRI. One possible reason is that the stimuli used in the Skerry and Saxe study [7] did not elicit sufficiently strong attributions of emotion in the subjects' brains. Another may be the low signal-to-noise ratio of the fMRI data. Though there are complex trade-offs in In the study [7] , vignettes for 20 emotion categories (three examples are shown in the first column) were rated along dimensions posited by three different theories (second column; model A, appraisal theory, 38 dimensions; model B, basic emotions, six dimensions; model C, valence/arousal, two dimensions). These ratings produced representations of each of the emotions in the feature space corresponding to each model (third column). Since the representational spaces for the different models have different dimensionalities, a transformation to 'similarity space' was then performed to ease comparison. Similarities between the 20 emotions were computed in the representational space of each model, yielding a Representational Dissimilarity Matrix (RDM) for each model (fourth column). Similarly, an RDM was derived from neural data collected while subjects read the vignettes in the scanner (bottom row). Lastly, the neural RDM was compared to each of the model RDMs using a rank correlation measure (last column). The winning model was the model with the highest correlation to the neural RDM -and the goodness-of-fit of this model to the neural data was assessed with respect to the noise in the neural data. Possible future extensions include the addition of further models of emotion, as well as visualization of the full RSA matrix (last column) with all brain regions included, perhaps using techniques such as multi-dimensional scaling, to fully explore representational geometries across brain regions and emotion models.
neuroimaging, future studies will likely be able to substantially improve sensitivity (raise the noise ceiling) by imaging with smaller voxels, faster acquisition times, and by using higher field strengths. These hardware advances will go hand in hand with processing refinements, such as surface-based analyses and less data smoothing [10] . Finally, it is of course well known that BOLD-fMRI, the neuroimaging method used in the paper [7] , is both indirect and macroscopic; fMRI pattern analysis as used here may not retrieve the relevant information present in underlying populations of single neurons [11] , adding uncertainty to the interpretation of the current findings. An even more challenging question is what models of emotion to use in the first place. The present study compared three emotion models, because these correspond to well entrenched theories. But of course an unbounded number of other models are possible: how many features should there be, and which features should one pick (why did Skerry and Saxe [7] 
Conceptual Interpretation
Prior studies have suggested that specific basic emotions might be associated with specific brain regions. For instance, the amygdala has often been linked to fear [12] , and medial prefrontal cortex to valence [13] . Skerry and Saxe [7] looked everywhere in the brain using a searchlight approach. The set of brain regions where the searchlight approach revealed information about the 20 emotions overlapped largely with an independently localized set of regions involved in attributing beliefs to people (the so-called 'theory of mind' network [14] ). As with the present finding [7] that a larger set of abstract features best describes how the brain attributes emotions, so too might such an expanded feature set best describe 'theory of mind' more generally [15] . That is, we always represent what other people are thinking and feeling from a large and diverse set of features that can flexibly describe many different situations. The apparent simplicity of some findings (only six basic emotions; only attributing beliefs) may have more to do with the simplicity of the stimuli or the task used in a particular study, rather than reflecting how the brain actually represents other people's minds in general. It thus appears that there is a neural system for thinking about other people, but exactly what it is that the regions comprising this system represent is typically complex and abstract. Indeed, the situation is probably more complicated yet, since there may be no single neural system, but rather a collection of systems that only partly overlap [16] .
One possible next step may be to extend the investigation by combining the competing theories. One could imagine constructing a more complex framework consisting of an underlying dimensionality of valence and arousal, a more fine-grained classification into six or so 'basic' emotion categories, and a very fine-grained and more flexible attribution based on appraisal features [17] . Perhaps we use a mixture of these when we attribute emotions to others, or when we experience them ourselves (another recent study suggests as much [18] ). Perhaps the extent to which one of the three schemes dominates depends on the details of the stimuli and the task. Perhaps this also shows interesting individual differences. Maybe children begin with the simpler types of attributions, whereas adults engage in more appraisal. Acknowledging this flexibility and variability in how we attribute emotions would open up a large set of new studies that would also link to psychopathology.
It is important to remember that all such studies are still studies of how laypeople attribute emotions to others in everyday life. The participants in the studies are not emotion researchers themselves. What can be said about how scientists should attribute emotions to people, let alone how they should attribute them to other animals? What is the best science of emotion? That project might not use the words we normally use for emotions at all [19] , and might attempt a broader survey of features that all emotions share across species [20] . Could a future science of emotion look completely alien to the layperson, as do current scientific theories in physics, for example? Skerry and Saxe [7] suggest a more optimistic view: plausibly, one reason for the relative success of psychological emotion theories is that they haven't got it completely wrong, even if they haven't got it completely right. By telling us that a higher-dimensional abstract feature space best explains how our brains ordinarily represent emotions, the study may be telling the emotion scientist that this would be a fruitful place to start as well.
A persistent myth in neuroscience has been the idea that brain asymmetry -the different functions of the left and right sides of the nervous system -is a uniquely human trait. Of course, there could be uniquely human biological traits that also show asymmetry (e.g. language), but brain asymmetry in itself is so widespread in the animal kingdom that it can be very plausibly considered a fundamental principle of organization of their nervous systems. In recent years, besides having been shown in vertebrates [1] , laterality has been found to occur also in invertebrates, such as Caenorhabditis elegans [2] and the honeybee [3] , thus revealing that brain size or number of neurons is certainly not a key factor in the emergence of cerebral asymmetry. However, in spite of the huge amount of evidence for brain asymmetry in different animal groups, there is still debate on one particular manifestation of cerebral and functional asymmetry in behaviour in the form of handedness. A recent study in Current Biology by Giljov et al. [4] now provides for the first time evidence for true handedness in some species of marsupials.
The term 'handedness' describes manual asymmetries at the population level, whereas 'hand preference' refers usually to the individual level. Though there might be some geographical variation [5] , around 90% of humans are right-handed. In non-human primates, whereas there is little doubt that individuals may show hand preferences, differences in the methods used to study manual asymmetries (tasks, sample size, etc.) have sometimes produced discrepant findings [6] . Nonetheless, some striking evidence for handedness has emerged, particularly in great apes. Bill Hopkins and his collaborators [7] have collected data for more than 700 chimpanzees from four different populations who have been tested for hand use on a task requiring coordinated bimanual actions, revealing a significant right-hand bias in each sampled population. The captive chimp colonies that Hopkins studied are 60-70 percent right-handed, regardless of the proportion of individuals in each colony that were human-reared. Thus, it has been suggested that, whereas there might be a genetic basis for handedness in chimpanzees, it must be expressed less strongly than in humans. This may be due to the fact that right-handedness in humans is associated with the left hemisphere's specialization for language and speech production. Yet, the association is far from straightforward, because handedness in humans is only weakly correlated with cerebral dominance for either praxis or language [8] . Besides, the argument based on the strength of handedness between human and non-human animals is problematic. First, because the measures of handedness in humans (largely based on questionnaires) rarely compare with those carried out in non-human animals (for exceptions, see [9] ). Second, if we look at other animals, the idea that handedness is present with maximal strength only in our species is untenable. Parrots, for instance, show preferred use of a foot, the left foot in most species, to hold food objects with percentages of bias at the population level that parallel or exceed those of human handedness [10] .
Even among non-human primates the presence or absence of handedness should be not taken as a cue of the presence of other biases that indicate the presence of functional asymmetry in the brain. Common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus), for instance, have a preferred hand in simple reaching tasks which develops by the time they are 8-12 months old and each individual uses the same preferred hand across its lifetime [11] , but no population bias is apparent. However, the same group of marmosets has been shown to display a striking group bias in a completely
